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ASSESSING PATIENT PROTECTION LAWS 
DAYNA BOWEN MATTHEW* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Professors Hall and Sloan have written a paper that contributes 
significantly to the literature on managed care regulation.1  First, their research 
makes a significant empirical contribution, by compiling, coding and analyzing 
the fifty states’ various patient protection laws to create a database for future 
observation and study.  Second, this research makes an important analytical 
contribution by describing the extent to which managed care regulation 
addresses specific defects in the market for managed care services.  This 
comment offers observations about the latter contribution. 
By undertaking the task of examining the extent to which patient 
protection laws address market failures, their article begins to examine whether 
these regulations do any “good,” or, more precisely, whether there is any 
objective justification for their enactment.  Indeed, one would hope this 
question was asked before the regulations were enacted.  Nevertheless, 
Professors Hall and Sloan provide a paradigm and data, allowing a 
retrospective look that is instructive for future regulatory efforts.  Hall and 
Sloan conclude that few of the current patient protection laws address the most 
important failures that characterize this market.2  Certainly, this observation is 
both correct and useful as far as it goes.  However, this comment suggests two 
further inquiries. 
In Part II, I challenge Professors Hall and Sloan’s underlying assumption 
that if the market for managed care functioned properly—perfectly 
competitively—then there would be no need for regulatory intervention to 
achieve optimal resource allocation and distribution.  This comment suggests 
that the purpose of patient protection laws may not be simply to correct market 
failure.  Some patient protection regulation may be justified as serving other 
 
*Gallion and Baker Professor of Law and Medicine, University of Kentucky College of Law; J.D. 
1987, University of Virginia; B.A. 1981, Harvard-Radcliffe College.  My sincere thanks to the 
faculty and guests of the 2002 Health Law Symposium, sponsored by the Saint Louis University 
School of Law, for the opportunity to participate in this program. 
 1. Mark A. Hall & Frank A. Sloan, Market Failures and the Evolution of State Regulation 
of Managed Care, 65 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 2002, at 169. 
 2. Id. at 205-06. 
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objectives.  In Part III, I observe that the theory of relational contracts—as 
managed care contracts must be correctly viewed—may provide a more 
complete explanation of the patient protection laws than the market failure 
approach alone. 
II.  PROFESSORS HALL AND SLOAN’S ANALYSIS SUMMARIZED 
To appreciate Professors Hall and Sloan’s analysis, one must begin with 
the assumption that if the market for managed care health services was 
perfectly competitive, medical goods and services could be optimally allocated 
through it, free of any government regulation.  The perfectly competitive 
market alone would achieve optimal levels of production, efficient pricing and 
allocative efficiency of resources and inputs.3  It is clear, however, that the 
market for managed care—like the market for health care generally—is far 
from a perfectly competitive one. Professors Hall and Sloan identify five key 
market failures that distort the market for managed care.4  First, consumers lack 
information.5  Managed care goods and services are credence goods; neither 
consumers nor regulators may easily determine reasonable or equilibrium 
levels of quality, costs or pricing by any reliably objective method, either 
before or after the goods are consumed.  The information required to contract 
for goods and services in this market is costly or unavailable; therefore, 
meaningful comparisons between managed care products are difficult.  
Moreover, managed care contracts restrict consumers’ choice so that the 
market discipline that results when consumers “vote with their feet” is absent 
from the managed care market.  Second, the managed care insurance market is 
imperfect due to adverse selection and cream skimming.6  Insurers are unable 
both to predict the actuarial value of the losses they insure and to accurately 
price the product they deliver.  Thus, they seek to reduce the quality of the 
product delivered, or to exclude sicker patients from their plans in order to 
control costs.  Hall and Sloan call this imperfect risk adjustment phenomenon 
the “Achilles Heel” of managed care and managed competition.  The third 
identified market failure arises from the first two.  “Churning” or high member 
turnover reduces the long-term savings that managed care is designed to 
achieve through improved preventative care and monitoring.7  The disparities 
between employer and employee preferences in the managed care market 
constitute the fourth market failure Professors Hall and Sloan identify.8  
 
 3. See Kenneth J. Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care, 53 AM. 
ECON. REV. 941, 942 (1963). 
 4. Hall & Sloan, supra note 1, at 172-182. 
 5. Id. at 172-77. 
 6. Id. at 177-79. 
 7. Id. at 179-180. 
 8. Id. at 180-81. 
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Finally, Hall and Sloan note that it is impossible to deliver the socially optimal 
level of managed care goods and services because transaction costs associated 
with determining the marginal benefit and marginal cost of each patient’s care 
are prohibitive.9  The result has been the industry’s imperfect effort to 
standardize patient care, which is the fifth market failure that Hall and Sloan 
identify.10 
Professors Hall and Sloan have tried to simplify and categorize the list of 
market imperfections that might be addressed by patient protection regulation 
by using the following catch-all terms: (1) Consumer Ignorance and 
Asymmetric Information; (2) Imperfect Risk Adjustment; (3) Myopic 
Orientation of Health Plans; (4) Lack of Consumer Choice; and (5) 
Standardization of Care. 
The next part of the Hall-Sloan analysis utilizes the invaluable database 
these scholars have created, by coding and cataloging the managed care and 
patient protection laws from each of the states.11  Their analysis applies what 
Altman and Rosman have called the “elective model” of regulation.12  This 
regulatory approach is “[t]he least interventionist point of view . . . . [in which 
the] government only imposes regulations if required to correct market 
 
 9. Hall & Sloan, supra note 1, at 181-82. 
 10. Professors Hall and Sloan have identified five defects in the managed care market.  All 
but one have to do with decisions or characteristics of the parties to a managed care contract.  
While their article does a good job of identifying those market failures that have to do with the 
characteristics of the market participants themselves, two other categories of market failures are 
not mentioned: structural market defects and defects due to the very nature of the goods and 
services distributed in the market. 
  Structural defects arise simply because of the organizational infrastructure of the subject 
market itself.  In managed care, for instance, the sheer numbers of sellers or individual buyers 
may prove to be a source of market failure.  For example, in rural health markets, the shortage of 
tertiary care hospital providers structurally impedes perfect competition for managed care 
services in that sector. 
  A second category of market failure may arise from the nature of the goods and services 
themselves that are produced and distributed through a given market.  Here, the market failure in 
the health care industry generally completely overlaps with the defects that hinder perfect 
competition in the market for managed care services.  For example, tertiary care hospitals, reliant 
on costly medical technology and highly trained specialists, constitute a natural monopoly; 
therefore, managed care plans are unable to offer the services of these providers in a perfectly 
competitive environment simply because the product itself is unresponsive to the classic 
competitive model. 
 11. These laws include “gag clauses”; “prudent layperson” standards of emergency coverage 
statutes; tort liability laws; ombudsmen for appeals; independent and external review laws; 
mandated benefits laws; point of service requirements; medical necessity definitions; limitations 
on financial incentives available to plan doctors; procedural protections for physicians; and 
restrictions on indemnification provisions insurers may obtain from physicians. 
 12. Stuart H. Altman & Brian Rosman, Introduction: The Philosophy of Regulation, in 
REGULATING MANAGED CARE, at xxiv (Stuart H. Altman et al. eds., 1999). 
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failures.”13  Adherents to this model often explain the need for suggested 
regulations by demonstrating that markets fall short of achieving desired 
equilibria without the regulation.14  However, the elective model philosophy 
does not result in a monolithic approach to regulation.  For example, Walter 
Zelman distinguishes two groups of elective model theorists, explaining “the 
goal of market-directed regulation then, is not to protect individuals in the face 
of market failure but to reduce the probability of such failure in the first 
place.”15 
Hall and Sloan’s work is descriptive and, therefore, neither ex post nor a 
priori.  Nevertheless, their posture as elective model theorists is clear and their 
preference for legislation that prevents market failure is strongly suggested.16  
The analytical approach they take involves matching the list of patient 
protection regulations they compiled, with the five identified categories of 
managed care market failures.  To the extent that the regulatory measure 
matches or “fits” with an identifiable failure, that regulation serves a purpose.  
Absent such a connection between regulation and market defect, Hall and 
Sloan question the purpose and effectiveness of the subject law.  Table 1 
summarizes the correlations between patient protection laws and market 
defects that Hall and Sloan have identified.  Table 1 also combines the two 
important strains of Hall and Sloan’s empirical research, to display the core of 
their analytical contribution. 
 
 13. Id. 
 14. See, e.g., William Encinosa, The Economics of Regulatory Mandates on the HMO 
Market, 20 J. HEALTH ECON. 85 (2001) (socially optimal levels of quality care and access to 
specialty care unavailable through markets absent regulation). 
 15. Walter Zelman, Regulating Managed Care: An Overview, in REGULATING MANAGED 
CARE 13 (Stuart H. Altman et al. eds., 1999); See also Patricia A. Butler, The Current Status of 
State and Federal Regulation, in REGULATING MANAGED CARE 33 (Stuart H. Altman et al. eds., 
1999) (describing the regulatory tools state and government may use to “enhance the functioning 
of a market in health care”). 
 16. See Hall & Sloan, supra note 1, at 197 (“However, these ex post protections are in 
tension with increased choice at the point of insurance purchase, which is the market’s primary 
engine.”). 
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TABLE 1 
 
CORRELATIONS BETWEEN MANAGED CARE REGULATIONS AND 
MARKET FAILURES 
 
Patient Protection 
Law17 
Market Defect 
Addressed 
Authors’ Comments 
 
 
 
Liability (14) 
 
Liability and Appeal 
 
Information 
Asymmetry, 
Standardization,18 
Plan/Patient Agency 
Disparities, Lack of 
Consumer Choice19 
 
 
 
“[R]espond[s] directly 
to market failure 
resulting from patients= 
inability to judge 
quality.”20 
 
Anti-Indemnity (26) 
 
Information 
Asymmetry, 
Physician/Patient 
Agency Disparities21 
 
Responds directly to 
market failure resulting 
from patients’ inability 
to judge quality and 
potential compromises 
in physicians’ 
professional 
independence.22   
 
 17. The number of states having adopted this provision as of 2001 is noted in parenthesis. 
 18. Hall and Sloan theorize that liability laws “respond directly to the market failure that 
results from patients’ inability to judge quality. . . .  In theory, tort liability will encourage plans 
to provide care and honor their promises up to the level where the marginal cost of extra care 
equals the marginal benefit of harm avoided.”  Id. at 191. 
 19. Explaining why the Coase Theorem does not operate in the managed care contract, the 
authors note that “employers negotiate the primary insurance contract and they may not fully or 
accurately reflect employees’ preferences. . . .”  Id. at 193. 
 20. Id. at 191. 
 21. The agency disparity between managed care plans’ interests and the interests of the 
patients who rely upon their decisions represents a market failure rationale that Hall and Sloan 
argue explains liability provisions addressing negligent coverage decisions.  See id. at 191-92.  
However, the agency disparity relevant to liability provisions addressing the quality of medical 
care is between the physician and the patient.  This second disparity is an example of a market 
failure important to the Hall-Sloan analysis, but not included in the original list of five market 
failures relevant to their initial analysis. 
 22. Hall & Sloan, supra note 1, at 191-92. 
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External Review (42) 
 
Information 
Asymmetry, 
Standardization, 
Plan/Patient Agency 
Disparities, Lack of 
Consumer Choice,23 
Myopia 
 
Addresses the same 
issues and shares same 
justifications as liability 
provisions.24 
 
Funding Ombudsman 
(18) 
 
Information 
Asymmetry, 
Standardization, 
Plan/Patient Agency 
Disparities, Lack of 
Consumer Choice, 
Myopia 
 
Addresses the same 
issues and shares same 
justifications as liability 
provisions. 
 
 
 
Any Willing Provider 
(26) 
 
 
Provider Access Laws 
 
Imperfect Risk 
Adjustment, Myopia25 
 
 
 
Reasonably good fit 
with significant market 
failure. 
 
 23. The authors conclude that “external review laws address the same issues and share in the 
same justifications [as liability laws].”  Id. at 193. The authors further add turnover and patient 
heterogeneity as justifications for external review laws.  “Additional, external review addresses 
the problem of incomplete or ‘relational’ contracting that arises from the inability to specify in 
concrete detail exactly what medical services are covered by insurance.”  Id. 
 24. Id. at 192. 
 25. Professors Hall and Sloan seem to use “myopia” earlier in the paper to describe managed 
care plans’ shortsighted decisions to drop sick patients from their contracts, but later use the term 
to describe patients’ failure to know or plan ahead for uncertainty of the illnesses that require 
coverage.  Compare Hall & Sloan, supra note 1, at 194, with id. at 195.  Therefore, it would seem 
important to add “Information Asymmetry” to the list of market failures justifying these 
regulations, based on the authors’ explanation: 
Access provisions that are more narrowly tailored to chronic or especially severe 
conditions address two different concerns: insurers’ incentive to provide poor service to 
those with chronic illness, and healthy consumers’ difficulty ex ante in knowing their own 
likely preferences where they to become ill in the future—in short the problems of risk 
adjustment and myopia (or salience). 
Id. at 194 (emphasis added).  This same observation applies to the authors’ discussion of Freedom 
of Choice and Continuity of Care provisions as well. 
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Freedom of Choice (35) 
 
Imperfect Risk 
Adjustment, Myopia 
 
Reasonably good fit 
with significant market 
failure. 
 
Access to OB/GYN 
without gatekeeper 
approval.  (42) 
 
Lack of Consumer 
Choice 
 
Broad access provision 
with weak relationship 
to market failure. 
 
Specialists (34) 
 
Lack of Consumer 
Choice 
 
 
 
Continuity of Care (36) 
 
Imperfect Risk 
Adjustment, Myopia 
 
Reasonably good fit 
with significant market 
failure. 
 
Point of Service (23) 
 
Lack of Consumer 
Choice 
 
Broad access provision 
with weak relationship 
to market failure. 
 
 
 
 
Medical Necessity (31) 
 
 
Coverage and 
Mandates 
 
Strongest justification is 
to facilitate external 
review, but should be 
default provision only. 
 
 
 
 
Weak market 
justification for 
specifying uniform 
definition. 
 
ER Prudent Layperson 
(47) 
 
Consumer Myopia, 
Public Goods 
 
Relates reasonably well 
to these failures.26 
 
Drive-Through Delivery 
(41) 
 
Collective action or 
adverse selection 
concerns27 
 
Empirical inquiry 
required to determine 
strength of link to 
market failures. 
 
 26. Although the authors say the “prudent layperson” standard addresses market failures 
“reasonably well,” elsewhere in the article they describe these provisions as “among the least 
significant of the different forms of patient protection.”  Id. at 195. 
 27. Although these were not market failures listed in the first half of the Hall and Sloan 
article, they are mentioned along with other classic justifications for regulatory intervention into 
markets.  See id. 
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Out-Patient Mastectomy 
(20) 
 
Collective action or 
adverse selection 
concerns28 
 
Empirical inquiry 
required to determine 
strength of link to 
market failures. 
 
 
 
 
Physician Incentives 
(29) 
 
 
Preserving MD 
Independence 
 
Information 
Asymmetry, 
Patient/Provider Agency 
Imperfection29 
 
 
 
Gag Clauses (50) 
 
 
 
Least significant of 
patient protection laws. 
Symbolic, not 
substantive. 
 
Physician Due Process 
(32) 
 
Information 
Asymmetry, 
Patient/Provider Agency 
Imperfection 
 
Address concern that 
MCO’s may 
compromise physician 
advice to patients. 
 
Hall and Sloan conclude their analysis with an “overall assessment” 
finding that the liability, external review and access to specialist provisions 
address market failures directly, while the other provisions “respond only 
weakly to legitimate market flaws.”30  Their analysis includes the caution that 
some provisions may exacerbate or even initiate other market defects if 
improperly applied, and the observation that regulatory enforcement measures 
give effect to the laws states have enacted. 
 
 28. Hall & Sloan, supra note 1, at 195. 
 29. Hall and Sloan discuss an agency imperfection in the beginning of their article, which 
describes the dichotomy of interests between employer/purchasers of group health insurers, and 
the employee/patients they represent.  However, they cite a different agency distortion here as a 
market failure: the distortion between the patient and the provider whose interests might diverge 
if physicians’ judgment is tainted by incentives MCO’s offer to act contrary to a patient’s best 
interest.  Id. at 192. 
 30. Id. at 197. 
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III.  RELATIONAL CONTRACTING THEORY—AN ALTERNATIVE JUSTIFICATION 
FOR PATIENT PROTECTION LAWS 
By choosing the elective analytical model, Hall and Sloan excluded 
alternative approaches to explain the usefulness of the patient protection laws.  
The directive model, for example, in which the government creates incentives 
for market participants to compete directly, may describe the motivation states 
have for requiring certain disclosures by managed care providers to facilitate 
consumer comparisons.  Similarly, the restrictive and prescriptive models 
whereby the government substitutes its own preferences for those of market 
participants, might explain the states’ decisions to mandate minimum 
maternity stays.  However, these models may explain the motivations for 
legislators enacting their provisions.  They do not, however, test the efficacy of 
the statutes that have been enacted.  In this sense, Hall and Sloan are looking to 
do more than these alternative models can deliver.  The relational theory of 
contract, however, is an analytical model that may work to better explain the 
states’ patient protection laws. 
Managed care agreements are a paradigmatic example of that unique set of 
contracts called relational contracts—contracts between parties who, at the 
time of contracting, cannot know or anticipate fully the eventualities that will 
trigger their respective obligations under the agreement.  Therefore, on a 
“going forward” basis, throughout the term of the contract, in order to jointly 
maximize the expected value of a managed care contract, both the 
provider/payor and the patient/participant must cooperate to minimize costs 
and maximize services under the agreement.  To the extent that the patient 
wishes to receive high quality medical care, paid for under the contract on a 
renewable basis, the participant must limit demands for the services the 
contract offers such that the overall cost of performance by the MCO does not 
exceed the aggregate premiums paid by plan participants.  Similarly, for the 
MCO to continue to receive premiums, it must stand ready to deliver the 
expected quality of health care goods and services called for as plan 
participants demand medical services under the contract, otherwise the plan 
will be unable to attract these patients year after year.  In a real sense, then, 
each party’s return under a managed care contract depends on the other party’s 
cooperative effort.31  Furthermore, the cooperation the parties seek must occur 
in a costly environment where information and transaction costs are low, 
monitoring is ineffective and conflicts of interest are inherent in the 
relationship.  Viewed in this context, managed care contracts are relational and 
the patient protection legislation regulating them governs these relationships by 
 
 31. See Robert E. Scott, A Relational Theory of Secured Financing, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 901, 
918-19 (1986). 
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a series of default rules that provide objective certainty in an uncertain 
contracting environment.32 
The Liability and Appeal rules states have enacted function as generalized 
rules that reduce the risk of strategic behavior while at the same time inducing 
parties to share information that will allow them to jointly optimize the 
benefits of their bargain.  Coverage mandates and provider access laws provide 
customized provisions that define what the parties might reasonably have 
bargained for in advance, if we assume they are rational actors who had full 
information at the time they entered the contract.  Physician independence 
rules are more difficult to explain because they insure for the benefit of third 
parties outside the managed care bargain.  However, relational theory 
adequately explains these rules as limitations on strategic behavior and 
protections to ensure the parties receive the benefit of their bargain. 
It is far outside the scope of this Comment to comprehensively explore the 
relational contract literature’s application to the managed care industry.  
However, my intention here is to encourage a closer look at this literature’s 
ability to explain these laws, and the way they do and should work, to expand 
the very significant work that Professors Hall and Sloan have already done. 
 
 
 32. See generally Robert E. Scott, A Relational Theory of Default Rules For Commercial 
Contracts, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 597 (1990). 
